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Abstract
Previous work on voter control, which refers to situations where a chair seeks to change
the outcome of an election by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters, takes for granted that
the chair knows all the voters’ preferences and that all votes are cast simultaneously. However,
elections are often held sequentially and the chair thus knows only the previously cast votes
and not the future ones, yet needs to decide instantaneously which control action to take. We
introduce a framework that models online voter control in sequential elections. We show that
the related problems can be much harder than in the standard (non-online) case: For certain
election systems, even with efficient winner problems, online control by deleting, adding, or
partitioning voters is PSPACE-complete, even if there are only two candidates. In addition,
we obtain (by a new characterization of coNP in terms of weight-bounded alternating Turing
machines) completeness for coNP in the deleting/adding cases with a bounded deletion/addition
limit, and we obtain completeness for NP in the partition cases with an additional restriction.
We also show that for plurality, online control by deleting or adding voters is in P, and for
partitioning voters is coNP-hard.
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1 Introduction
Elections are important not just in the human world. They also can function as an important way of
aggregating the preferences of (often electronic) agents, in our world that is increasingly networked
and in which people and institutions will increasingly be spoken for by automated agents.
In the field of multiagent systems, voting has been suggested for tasks as varied as, for exam-
ple, recommender systems, collaborative spam filtering, and planning [ER97, GMHS99, DKNS01].
And not surprisingly, the study of the computational properties of voting systems has been an ex-
ceedingly active area within computational social choice.
In particular, various types of manipulation, electoral control, and bribery in voting have been
classified in terms of their computational complexity (see [FHHR09b, FHH10]). This paper focuses
on voter control, a model introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], where a chair at-
tempts to alter the outcome of an election via changing its structure by deleting, adding, or partition
of voters. These types of control seek to model such real-world behaviors as targeted vote sup-
pression, bring-out-the-vote drives, and districting/gerrymandering. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s
paper was in the bounded-rationality spirit of Simon [Sim69], and was in part making the point that
computational complexity is important in decision-making.
There have been many papers analyzing the (non-online) control complexity of election
systems, and seeking to find natural systems that make many types of control attack diffi-
cult (see the surveys [FHHR09b, FHH10], the book chapters [BR16, FR16, HHR16], and the
references therein). To the best of our knowledge, all previous work on control (see, e.g.,
[BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09, ENR09, EFRS15]) takes for granted that the chair has full
knowledge of all the voters’ preferences and that all votes are cast simultaneously.1 However, in
many settings voters vote sequentially and the chair’s task in such a setting may often be quite dif-
ferent: Knowing only the already cast votes but not the future ones, the chair must decide online
(i.e., in that moment) whether there exists a control action that guarantees success, no matter what
votes will be cast later on. We introduce a framework to model online voter control in sequential
elections. Our approach is inspired by the area of “online algorithms” [BE98]—algorithms running
and performing computational actions based only on the input data seen thus far.
In our framework of online voter control, the chair’s task stated above is based on a “maxi-min”
idea (although here, due to the time effects, that can involve more than two quantifiers), a typical
online-algorithmic theme; in that framing of the chair’s task we are following the approach that has
been used for online manipulation and online candidate control [HHR14, HHR12a]. Note that an-
other central online-algorithmic theme, a strictly numerical ratio approach to so-called “competitive
analysis,” would not apply very naturally here; the reason is that in its general setting, voting (in
social-choice theory) is most typically based on an ordinal notion of preferences, and those don’t
convey cardinal strength-of-affinity information regarding the outcome. (For some specific voting
systems such as so-called scoring systems one can interpret them as giving cardinal information, and
we commend as an interesting open issue a future, general control-complexity study for such sys-
1An exception is a paper by Fitzsimmons, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [FHH13] that is, regarding their earliest
appearing versions, more recent than the present paper, and studies a mixed model involving both a chair and manipula-
tors, in which the manipulative voters set their votes after actions by the chair.
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tems in terms of a competitive-ratio analysis; see [OL14], which takes that approach for the issue of
selecting a bundle of goods.) Sequential (or otherwise “dynamic”) voting has been studied in other
contexts as well, e.g., from a game-theoretic perspective as “Stackelberg voting games” [XC10]
(see also [DE10, DP01, Slo93]), or using an axiomatic approach [Ten04] or Markov decision pro-
cesses [PP13]. None of this work has considered the issue of voter control.
What our results show is that such online control problems can be much harder than in the
standard (non-online) case. We show that for certain election systems, even with efficient winner
problems, online control by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters is PSPACE-complete, even if
there are only two candidates. In addition, we obtain completeness for coNP in the deleting/adding
cases with a bounded deletion/addition limit. We do this by establishing a complexity-theoretic
result (Theorem 4.3) that is of interest in its own right: Polynomial-time alternating Turing machines
that on each accepting path make a constant number of “Yes” guesses accept only coNP languages,
and in fact this completely characterizes coNP. We also show that for plurality, online control by
deleting or adding voters is in P, and for partitioning voters is coNP-hard.
2 Motivation
The coming sections will give our definitions, results, and proofs. However, before that, the present
section will very informally present some motivation and examples. In particular, we give example
settings in which it is natural to study sequential action, in which the election’s “chair” has a use-
it-or-lose-it ability to do addition/deletion/partition-choice for each voter as the voter votes, and
the chair knows the votes of the voters seen so far, but not of future voters. Of course, theoretical
models don’t capture the many interactions and subtleties of the real world, and so our models don’t
perfectly capture the full richness of even these sample situations. Nonetheless, we feel that for
many cases, such as those we are about to mention, the theoretical models we develop in this paper
are far closer to capturing the real-world situation than are existing models of simultaneous voting
or even existing models where votes are sequential but all voters’ preferences are known ahead of
time.
As a concrete example (and let us for the moment not worry about what the particular election
system is), consider a College faculty meeting at which, going right around the room, the faculty
members hand their handwritten paper ballots to the Dean, who then passes them on to her admin-
istrative assistant, who quietly adds them to the totals he is keeping. But let us further assume that
the Dean is a shifty person, and can, for a certain number of ballots, slip the piece of paper into
her pocket after reading the vote, without that being noticed, and without the people in the room
being likely to notice that there aren’t quite enough votes in the totals (let’s suppose it is a big col-
lege). And the question is, given that we are at some particular point in going around the table (and
know what votes have been cast so far and what actions the Dean—or whoever was standing in for
her—has taken so far): Can the Dean ensure, using at most her remaining amount of vote-to-pocket
shifting, that the winner(s) of the election will include at least one of the alternatives she favors?
This setting loosely corresponds to our sequential version of control by deleting voters. For vivid-
ness, our examples are about humans voting and a human chair (in the above, the Dean), and in
the case just given, paper ballots. However, our model applies also to more electronically focused
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cases of preference aggregation, e.g., the “Dean” in the above example could be a doctored voting
machine that can only suppress so many ballots before seriously risking detection.
The above example is about deleting voters, but there are also natural examples for adding or
partitioning voters. For partitioning voters, imagine that a school’s undergraduate admissions office
is going to use a panel, whose members will each be assigned to one of two faculty committees, to
vet applying students (perhaps with the committees purportedly looking for different things, e.g.,
one is looking for traditional smartness and the other is looking for unusual levels of passion and
creativity), with all applicants’ folders given to both committees, and with each committee using
voting to select its favorite proposals, and then with only the winners of those two vetting elections
moving on to a final election in which all the panel members vote. Suppose a particular admissions
office staff member (who is the chair in this example), with all the faculty members lined up and
coming into the room, as each faculty member steps to the doorway briefly chats with the faculty
member well enough to discern the likely votes he or she will cast, and then right there assigns the
person to either the smartness committee or the passion committee. If the admissions staff member
does so with the goal of ensuring that at least one of a certain set of students (perhaps the students
who are great football quarterbacks, or the students whose parents might fund a new admissions
building) will be admitted, that very loosely put would be captured by our sequential version of
control by partition of voters.2 For adding voters, a natural model might be a political candidate
(who is the chair in this example) going door to door through her district in a preset order, and
knowing from public records which voters are registered voters and which are not, and at each door
meeting and learning the voter’s preferences among the candidates, and then for those voters who
are not registered deciding whether to use charisma to convince them to register and vote, with the
limitation that the candidate has only so much charisma to use.
The above are a few very informal examples of settings where sequential action is natural, and
one knows the votes cast so far but not those to be cast in the future (except who will be casting them
and in which order). Let us finish this informal section by briefly giving a mini-example of the flavor
of the goal we have for our chairs, and how that affects their actions. We are assuming that chairs
are very pessimistic: What a chair wants to know is whether there is some action she can take at the
given moment so that one of her preferred candidates will win no matter what the value is of all the
currently unknown-to-her future votes—but assuming that her own future decisions are (of course)
aimed at supporting her goal. To make this more concrete, let us discuss the most important real-
world election system: plurality. In our addition-of-voters example above, suppose the candidate
going door to door has only one preferred candidate in the election, namely, herself. Then it is
quite clear and simple what she should do. Until she runs out of charisma, she should for each
unregistered voter she meets for whom she is the favorite candidate expend her charisma to have
that person become a registered voter. That is an “operational” approach that would work perfectly.
But more must be said. The question our pessimistic candidate (and our decision problems) wants
answered at each point is whether, whatever the preferences still to come after the current point are,
that candidate will win. And it is also clear how to judge that. The candidate, as she starts speaking
2Actually, as our previous example suggested, our model is a bit more flexible and allows one to ask such questions
starting at an intermediate point at which some actions have already been taken, potentially by a different admissions staff
member.
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with a given unregistered voter who likes our candidate the most (we can similarly describe how
to reason in the other cases), reasons as follows: I need to assume that all future voters (whose
preferences I don’t currently know!) concentrate their votes on a candidate other than me who
currently has the most votes (in the tally I have been building in my canvas so far), and that I use
my charisma to (if it is not expended) add the current unregistered voter, and then I suppress those
hypothetical, unregistered, against-me voters, and would that leave me a winner of this election? If
the answer is yes, then the candidate should be very happy, as she knows she can guarantee herself
victory as long as she doesn’t later do anything overtly stupid with her charisma. The example
we just gave is in effect explaining why it holds that (so-called constructive) control by adding
voters is in polynomial time for sequential plurality elections. Now, one might assume that plurality
is such a simple system that for all types of sequential control we will obtain polynomial-time
algorithms. However, as Theorem 5.2 we will show that that is not the case (unless P = NP). The
proof of that result is in effect giving an example—although admittedly a more complex one—in
which a coNP-hard problem, namely the complement of Hitting Set, is transformed into an election
control instance about sequentially partitioning voters (the control setting we described above in our
example about college admissions).
3 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard complexity-theoretic notions such as the complexity classes P,
NP, coNP, and PSPACE, polynomial-time many-one reductions (≤pm), ≤pm-hardness, and ≤pm-
completeness [HU79, Pap94]. A standard NP-complete problem is the satisfiability problem (SAT)
from propositional logic, a standard coNP-complete problem is the tautology problem, and the
quantified boolean formula problem (QBF) is a standard PSPACE-complete problem.
This paper provides both polynomial-time algorithms and NP-completeness results. The latter
are worst-case results, and so it is possible that for certain distributions heuristics might do well
(see [RS13] for a survey of this in the context of elections). We commend this direction as an area for
future research. However, such studies are quite dependent on distributions, and by relatively recent
work, it is known that for the uniform distribution heuristic algorithms cannot asymptotically have
subexponential error frequency on any NP-hard problem unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses
to (and indeed, slightly further than) its third level [BH08, CCHO05, HW12]. (Note: An algorithm
is said to have subexponential error frequency if for every ε > 0 the number of errors the algorithm
makes at length n is O(2nε ); see [HW12] for a more detailed explanation.)
3.1 Voter Control Types in Simultaneous Elections
A pair (C,V ) is called a (standard or simultaneous) election if C is a set of candidates and V a list
of voters that all have cast their votes simultaneously. We assume that each vote in V has the form
(v, p), where v is the name of this voter and p is v’s (total) preference order over C. For example, if
C = {c,d,e} then (Bob,d > e > c) ∈V indicates that Bob (strictly) prefers d to e and e to c (or, to
be more precise, it indicates that that is the ballot Bob has cast).
The standard types of (constructive) voter control in simultaneous elections are as follows.
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(These are as introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], except here we will follow the
now more standard model—called the nonunique-winner model—of asking whether a candidate can
be made a winner, rather than their approach—called the unique-winner model—of asking whether
a candidate can be made the one and only winner.) An election system is a mapping from elections
(votes/candidates) to a winner set. Let E be a given election system. In control by deleting voters
(E -CCDV), given an election (C,V ), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer
k ≤ ‖V‖, we ask whether there exists a set of at most k voters from V such that c is an E winner
of the election in which that set of voters is removed. In control by adding voters (E -CCAV), we
are given a candidate set C, a list V of registered voters with preferences over C, a list V ′ of as
yet unregistered voters with preferences over C, a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative
integer k ≤ ‖V ′‖, and the question is whether there exists a set of at most k voters from V ′ such that
c is an E winner of the election where the voters are that set and all of V . Finally, in control by
partition of voters, we are given an election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and we ask
whether V can be partitioned into two sublists, V1 and V2, such that c is an E winner of the election
(W1∪W2,V ), where Wi for i∈ {1,2} is the (possibly empty) set of winners of subelection (C,Vi) that
have survived the tie-handling rule used and by V here we implicitly mean V masked down to just
those candidates in W1 ∪W2. Of the two tie-handling models introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hema-
spaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] we focus on the ties-promote (TP) model only, where all winners of
a subelection proceed to the runoff, since that model fits more naturally with the nonunique-winner
model in which we will define our online control problems. The resulting problem is denoted by
E -CCPV.
The destructive variants of these three problems, denoted by E -DCDV, E -DCAV, and E -DCPV,
are obtained by requiring that the distinguished candidate c is not a winner of the election resulting
from the control action at hand [HHR07].
3.2 Online Voter Control in Sequential Elections
We study online voter control in sequential elections, where we assume that the voters vote in order,
one after the other, each expressing preferences over all the candidates. If u is the current voter and
C the given candidate set, an election snapshot for C and u is specified by a triple V = (V<u,u,Vu<),
where the earlier voters V<u have already cast their votes, each a preference order over C, and now
it is u’s turn to cast a vote, and the future voters Vu< will cast their votes in the order listed. (V<u
and u of course list the votes cast and who cast them, but Vu< just gives the order of the voters
following u.) This snapshot approach is natural for studying online attacks on elections, and was
used previously to study the different type of attack known as online manipulation in sequential
elections [HHR13, HHR14].
We now define our notions of online voter control for the standard voter control types stated
above, and the related problems. They all will start from a basic online voter control setting (an
OVCS, for short), augmented by appropriate additional information according to the control type
at hand. A basic OVCS (C,u,V,σ ,d) consists of a set C of candidates, the current voter u (which
isn’t strictly needed here, as u is clearly singled out within V anyway), an election snapshot V for
C and u, the chair’s preference order σ on C, and a distinguished candidate d ∈ C. Let E be a
given election system and let WE (C,V ) denote the E winner set of (standard) election (C,V ). For
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each online voter control type we will define, the question the chair faces is: Does there exist a
control-action choice of our considered type regarding the current voter (e.g., whether or not to
delete u) such that if the chair takes that action, then no matter what votes the remaining voters after
u cast, the chair’s goal can be reached by the current decision regarding u and by using the chair’s
future decisions (if any), each being made using the chair’s then-in-hand knowledge about what
votes have been cast by then?3 By the chair’s goal we mean to ensure WE (C,V ′)∩{c | c ≥σ d} 6= /0
for each possible ultimate election (C,V ′) (i.e., each V ′ is a possible vote list resulting from the
control type at hand after all decisions have been made by the chair and all voters have cast their
votes) in the constructive case, and to ensure that WE (C,V ′)∩{c | d ≥σ c} = /0 in the destructive
case (i.e., that neither d nor any candidate the chair likes even less than d is a winner).4 Note that the
conditions WE (C,V ′)∩{c | c ≥σ d} 6= /0 and WE (C,V ′)∩{c | d ≥σ c} = /0 defining the chair’s goal
have the flavor, give or take the fact that we are focusing on a top segment of σ , of the nonunique-
winner model, e.g., as long as WE (C,V ′)∩{c | c ≥σ d} 6= /0 we call it success even if more than one
candidate ties as winner. To formally define our problems, it remains to specify for each control
type the information by which the basic OVCS is augmented. What kind of decisions the chair is to
make in the course of a sequential election will always be clear from the control type at hand (e.g.,
whether or not to delete a voter in “online control by deleting voters”).
Let B = (C,u,V,σ ,d) be a given basic OVCS. For online control by deleting voters, B is aug-
mented by the following additional information: A nonnegative integer k (the deletion upper bound);
for each voter v before u, there is a flag saying whether v was deleted and the vote cast by v (if not
deleted)—at most k voters can be marked as deleted for the input to be syntactically legal; and
3Note that this maxi-min-inspired (but with more quantifiers) approach is really about alternating quantifiers. We are
asking if there exists a current action of the chair, such that for all potential revealed vote values that come between now
and the next time the chair has to decide on an action, there exists a next action by the chair, such that for all . . . . . . the
chair reaches her goal.
4Why do we provide an ordering σ rather than just providing as a list the set of candidates who are good enough
to count as reaching our goal? For the decision-problem version of online voter control, which is our formulation here,
providing such a set would be just as good. But by making σ a part of the input, we make the model compatible, for the
future, with the interesting optimization problem of trying to find the most preferred candidate within σ for which the
chair can ensure that there is among the winner set one of the candidates in the segment from that candidate to the top
candidate in σ .
Also, to avoid any confusion, we note that in our “d chooses an upper (constructive case) or lower (destructive case)
segment of the candidates” approach, the non-online version’s situation that the destructive goal “opposing” a constructive
goal is specified in the same way not longer holds (although we could have defined things in a less natural way so that
that would hold). That is, in the non-online setting, the distinguished candidate d in the constructive case is saying
who the chair wants to win, and in the destructive case is saying who the chair wants to not win; d in one case is
defined in the problem definition to denote the beloved candidate and in the other case is defined to denote the despised
candidate. However, in our case, we are giving an order σ , and it would be perverse and confusing to have > mean one
thing for constructive and another for destructive. And so, as we have defined things, if the chair’s stated ordering σ is
v1 > v2 > v3 > v4 > v5 and d = v2, in the constructive case that means that the chair wants at least one of v1 or v2 to win.
To state the destructive-case goal—which in some sense is the “flip” of that constructive-case goal—of having neither v1
nor v2 be a winner, one would give as the chair’s ordering v5 > v4 > v3 > v2 > v1 and d = v2, since this specifies that v2
and v1 are the chair’s two most despised candidates and are the ones the chair wants to prevent from being winners.
These comments simply refer to the way various “opposite” goals happen to be expressed. None of the above is saying
that the constructive problem (viewed as a set) and the destructive problem (viewed as a set) are each other’s complements.
Due to the quantification involved regarding the actions being taken such as by the chair, that is not true.
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the vote the current voter u will cast (if not selected for deletion). We denote these problems by
online-E -CCDV (constructive) and online-E -DCDV (destructive). (We certainly could equivalently
formulate the problem in a way that masks out all earlier deleted voters, and so removes the need for
the flagging; but we prefer the above version since it allows the actual history of the voting situation
to be part of the instance.)
For online control by adding voters, B is augmented by the following additional information: A
nonnegative integer k (the addition upper bound); each voter v in V has a flag saying if v is unreg-
istered (i.e., can be added) or registered—u must be unregistered; each unregistered voter v before
u has another flag saying if v was added—at most k voters may have that flag set in any syntac-
tically legal input; the vote cast is given for each registered or added unregistered voter before u;
and also given is the vote u will cast (if it is added). We denote these problems by online-E -CCAV
(constructive) and online-E -DCAV (destructive).
For online control by partition of voters, B is augmented by the following additional infor-
mation: Each voter v before u has a flag saying which part of the partition v was assigned to
(“left” or “right”) and the vote cast by v, and also u’s vote is given. We denote these problems
by online-E -CCPV (constructive) and online-E -DCPV (destructive). As a reminder, the two pre-
liminary elections are conducted under the convention that “ties promote” (i.e., all winners of the
preliminary elections move forward to the final election).
A natural worry about our maxi-min approach to online voter control is that it is always possible
that all the future voters are hostile to one’s goals. And in that case, one may be, depending on the
election system, powerless to reach one’s goal in the worst case, and so the maxi-min outcome is
easily seen to be failure to reach one’s goal. Although this worry exists in a weaker form for online
manipulation and online bribery, since for those if one is allowed almost no vote-changing one is in
many cases obviously in trouble, at least in those settings one can do whatever one wants to those
votes one does manipulate or bribe. In control, however, one doesn’t get to set the value of a single
vote, and that is pretty extreme.
This is a valid worry, but there are some things that keep it in perspective. Primarily, our paper
is trying to find out the very greatest complexity that online control in sequential elections can ever
have (when restricted to election systems having polynomial-time winner problems). And so we can
look at election systems that sidestep the above worry, due to their properties simply not matching
the intuition above (which assumed that we are using an election system in which having a lot of
bad-for-us votes results in a bad-for-us outcome). In effect, we are seeking to understand the limits
of behavior, in order to set a bounding box on the behaviors that can be realized. Of course, for
many natural election systems, the effect mentioned in the previous paragraph will hold, and for
many inputs that fact can be exploited to help achieve polynomial-time algorithms for the control
problem; indeed, in this paper itself, we give examples of achieving polynomial-time algorithms
for the most important of election systems: plurality. Of course, problems may start with some
votes already cast, and this may itself make for interesting “endgame” decision issues. We also very
much hope further studies will be conducted employing a range of models, including ones beyond
maxi-min.
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4 General Upper and Lower Bounds
Theorem 4.1 For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem,5
online-E -CCDV, online-E -DCDV, online-E -CCAV, online-E -DCAV, online-E -CCPV, and
online-E -DCPV are in PSPACE.
PROOF. The upper bounds follow from the observation that each of these problems can be solved
by an alternating Turing machine in polynomial time, and thus by a deterministic polynomial-space
Turing machine, by the characterization due to Chandra, Kozen, and Stockmeyer [CKS81]. ❑
Theorem 4.1 settles all general (i.e., regarding any voting system for which winner determina-
tion is easy) upper bounds for our online voter control problems. We now turn to exploring their
lower bounds.
4.1 Control by Deleting and by Adding Voters
Theorem 4.2 There exist election systems E and E ′ with polynomial-time winner problems such
that online-E -CCDV, online-E -CCAV, online-E ′-DCDV, and online-E ′-DCAV are PSPACE-
complete, even when limited to two candidates.
PROOF. Let (C,V ) be an election. We define election system E as follows. E interprets—in some
fixed, natural encoding—the lexicographically least candidate name in C as a boolean formula, Φ,
whose variable names must be the strings x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ for some ℓ, where x2ℓ actually appears in
Φ (the other variables don’t have to; no variables other than x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ are allowed). If these
syntactic requirements fail to hold, everyone loses in E . Otherwise, if any two voters in V have the
same name, everyone loses in E . Otherwise, order the voters in V lexicographically by name of the
voter, and let v1,v2, . . . ,vz be the voter names in this order. If z < 2ℓ or if there are less than two
candidates, everyone loses in E . Otherwise, if for some odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ−1, the two lowest order
bits of vi are not 00 or 01, or if for some even i, 2 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ, the two lowest order bits of vi are not
10 or 11, everyone loses in E . Otherwise, assign the variables of Φ(x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ) as follows. For
each odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ− 1, set xi to true if the two lowest order bits of vi are 01, and set xi to false
otherwise (i.e., the two lowest order bits of vi are 00). For each even i, 2 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ, set xi to true if
the name of the least preferred candidate in the vote of vi is lexicographically less than the name of
the next to least preferred candidate in the vote of vi, and set xi to false otherwise. If this assignment
satisfies Φ, everyone wins in E , and otherwise everyone loses. This ends the specification of E .
Since a boolean formula whose variables have all been assigned can be evaluated in polynomial
time, E has a polynomial-time winner problem.
By Theorem 4.1, online-E -CCDV is in PSPACE. To show PSPACE-hardness of
online-E -CCDV, we ≤pm-reduce the PSPACE-complete problem QBF′, a variant of QBF, to it.
QBF′ is the set of boolean formulas of the form F(x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ), for some ℓ, such that the variable
x2ℓ appears in F , all variables appearing in F are from the variable name collection “x1”, “x2”, . . . ,
“x2ℓ”, and
(∃b1)(∀b2) · · · (∃b2ℓ−1)(∀b2ℓ) [F(x1 := b1,x2 := b2, . . . ,x2ℓ := b2ℓ) evaluates to true],
5The statement of Theorem 4.1 holds even for election systems whose winner problems are in PSPACE.
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where bi ∈ {0,1} and xi := bi means that variable xi is set to true if bi = 1, and is set to false if
bi = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ.
Let F(x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ) be a given instance of QBF′, where x2ℓ explicitly appears in F . (If our
input is syntactically incorrect, we map it to a fixed no-instance of online-E -CCDV.) We construct
from F an instance of online-E -CCDV, consisting of a basic OVCS (C,u,V,σ ,d), augmented by the
additional information of online control by deleting voters, as follows. Define C = {a,b}, where a
encodes F (in our fixed, natural encoding of boolean formulas) and b is the string lexicographically
immediately following a; the current voter is u= v1; V will be specified below; the chair’s preference
order is a >σ b; for specificity, we let d = a be the distinguished candidate (though that does not
matter, as all candidates win or all lose in E ); the deletion limit is k = ℓ; and a vote a > b to cast
for u if not deleted (again, the vote doesn’t matter, as u = v1 will specify an assignment to x1 by
her name, not by her vote). There are (3/2) ·2ℓ= 3ℓ voters in V such that the name of the ith voter,
vi, is the binary string uiwi, where ui is the binary representation of i and wi = 00 if i ≡ 1 mod 3,
wi = 01 if i ≡ 2 mod 3, and wi = 10 if i ≡ 0 mod 3, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3ℓ. This completes the description
of our ≤pm-reduction from QBF′ to online-E -CCDV, which clearly can be computed in polynomial
time.
We claim that F ∈ QBF′ if and only if the chair’s goal can be reached by at most k deletions of
voters. Why? By the definition of E , everyone loses unless our k = ℓ deletions are used on exactly
one of v3i−2 and v3i−1, for each i, 1≤ i≤ ℓ. No v3i, 1≤ i≤ ℓ, can be deleted if there is to be a winner.
And the “exactly one of v3i−2 and v3i−1” choices, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, specify an assignment of truth values
to the odd-numbered variables: For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, x2i−1 is set to true if v3i−2 is deleted and v3i−1
is not, and is set to false if v3i−1 is deleted and v3i−2 is not. On the other hand, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ,
the truth value of x2i is specified by the vote of voter v3i, since after these ℓ deletions, v3i will be the
2ith voter name in the lexicographic order. It follows that the chair’s goal can be reached by at most
k deletions of voters if and only if (∃b1)(∀b2) · · · (∃b2ℓ−1)(∀b2ℓ) [F(x1 := b1,x2 := b2, . . . ,x2ℓ :=
b2ℓ) evaluates to true], which is true if and only if F ∈ QBF′.
PSPACE-hardness of online-E -CCAV for the election system E defined above can be shown via
essentially the same ≤pm-reduction from QBF′. The only difference is that we now map the given
QBF′ instance F to an instance of online-E -CCAV, which is defined exactly as the online-E -CCDV
instance constructed above, except that all voters vi with i ≡ 0 mod 3 are specified as registered
voters, and all other voters are unregistered. The correctness argument is analogous.
The destructive cases can be shown analogously, by modifying the election system E defined
above as follows, yielding our modified system E ′: Whenever everyone loses (wins) in E , every-
one wins (loses) in E ′. It follows from Theorem 4.1 and the above ≤pm-reduction from QBF′ that
online-E ′-DCDV and online-E ′-DCAV are both PSPACE-complete. ❑
For control by deleting or adding voters, the deletion or addition limit k is—both in the non-
online case and in our online definition (which is what is used in Theorem 4.2)—part of the prob-
lem instance. To better understand the source of the tremendous level of computational hardness
Theorem 4.2 showed that these problems can have, let us now consider restrictions of these problems
in which the deletion or addition limit is bounded by a constant. For a given election system E and a
fixed k, let online-E -CCDV[k] be the restriction of online-E -CCDV to those inputs whose deletion
limit is at most k, and define the problem variant online-E -CCAV[k] analogously. We will show in
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Theorem 4.4 that this change in the definition—bounding the deletion/addition bound—brings the
complexity of these problems from PSPACE down to coNP. (In contrast, limiting the number of
candidates to two was shown by Theorem 4.2 to leave these two problems PSPACE-complete.)
The coNP upper bound follows immediately from the following theorem about restricted
polynomial-time alternating Turing machines, which is of interest in its own right. If we define the
weight of a path of an alternating Turing machine to be the number of 1’s in the existential guesses
along the path, what Theorem 4.3 says is that the class of languages accepted by polynomial-time
alternating Turing machines whose accepting paths are weight-bounded is precisely coNP.
Theorem 4.3 Let k ≥ 0. The class of languages accepted by polynomial-time alternating Turing
machines that satisfy the property that on each accepting computation path the number of existential
guesses on which the bit is guessed as 1 is at most k is precisely coNP.
PROOF. We will show this by induction on k. It is immediate that the k = 0 case is precisely
coNP. To prove the inductive step, let k > 0 and let A be a language accepted by a polynomial-
time alternating Turing machine that satisfies the property that on each accepting computation path
the number of existential guesses on which the bit is guessed as 1 is at most k. (That is, any path
that contains at least k+1 guessed 1’s in its existential guesses must have as its (leaf) value Reject
rather than Accept. Recall that each path of a polynomial-time alternating Turing machine has as
its individual (leaf) value either Accept or Reject, and the overall action of the Turing machine
is determined by the thought-experiment of applying the existential and universal node actions of
the machine to those leaf values, resulting in an Accept or Reject at the root that determines the
machine’s acceptance or rejection on the given input.) We will show that A is in coNP.
Throughout this proof, all xi’s and yi’s are over {0,1}, i.e., are bits.
Let B be a polynomial-time computable ternary predicate and let ℓ(n) be a polynomial such that
for all x, x ∈ A if and only if
∀x1∃y1 ∀x2∃y2 . . .∀xℓ(|x|)∃yℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),y1 . . .yℓ(|x|))∧
ℓ(|x|)
∑
i=1
yi ≤ k
)
.
Such a polynomial and predicate exist, since we can add extra quantifiers with dummy variables to
make the quantifiers alternating and we can always guess an existentially-quantified dummy variable
as 0.
We can rewrite the above as follows. For all x, x ∈ A if and only if
∀x1 (∀x2∃y2 ∀x3∃y3 . . . ∀xℓ(|x|)∃yℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),1y2 . . .yℓ(|x|))∧∑ℓ(|x|)i=2 yi ≤ k− 1
)
∨
∀x2 (∀x3∃y3 . . . ∀xℓ(|x|)∃yℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),01y3 . . .yℓ(|x|))∧∑ℓ(|x|)i=3 yi ≤ k− 1
)
∨
∀x3 (. . . ∀xℓ(|x|)∃yℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),001y4 . . .yℓ(|x|))∧∑ℓ(|x|)i=4 yi ≤ k− 1
)
∨
.
.
.
∀xℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),0ℓ(|x|)−11)∧∑ℓ(|x|)i=ℓ(|x|)+1 yi ≤ k− 1
)
∨
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),0ℓ(|x|)) . . . ))).
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(Of course, ∑ℓ(|x|)i=ℓ(|x|)+1 yi ≤ k− 1 is true, since k > 0 in the present case.) The long expression
above is not quite in the right form to apply the inductive hypothesis. In order to be able to do so,
define language C such that 〈x,x1 . . .xr〉 ∈C if and only if r ≤ ℓ(|x|) and
∀xr+1∃yr+1 . . .∀xℓ(|x|)∃yℓ(|x|)
(
B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),0r−11yr+1 . . .yℓ(|x|))∧
ℓ(|x|)
∑
i=r+1
yi ≤ k−1
)
.
Clearly C can be accepted by a polynomial-time alternating Turing machine that satisfies the prop-
erty that on each accepting computation path the number of existential guesses on which the bit is
guessed as 1 is at most k−1. By the inductive hypothesis, C is in coNP. Since x ∈ A if and only if
∀x1(〈x,x1〉 ∈C∨∀x2(〈x,x1x2〉 ∈C∨∀x3(〈x,x1x2x3〉 ∈C∨
. . .∀xℓ(|x|)(〈x,x1x2x3 . . .xℓ(|x|)〉 ∈C)∨B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),0ℓ(|x|)) . . . ))),
it follows that A is in coNP. (Why is it in coNP? Note that its complement is in NP due to having a
polynomial-length witnesses. Let N be a fixed NP Turing machine accepting C. Our witness scheme
for membership in A is: Guess an x1, . . . ,xℓ(|x|) such that B(x,x1 . . .xℓ(|x|),0ℓ(|x|)) holds and also guess
for each of 〈x,x1〉, 〈x,x1x2〉, . . ., 〈x,x1x2 . . .xℓ(|x|)〉 an accepting path of N on that input.)
❑
Theorem 4.4 For each k ≥ 0, the following hold:
1. (a) For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem, online-E -CCDV[k] is
in coNP. (b) There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such
that online-E -CCDV[k] is coNP-complete, even when limited to two candidates.
2. (a) For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem, online-E -CCAV[k] is
in coNP. (b) There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such
that online-E -CCAV[k] is coNP-complete, even when limited to two candidates.
PROOF SKETCH. Parts 1(a) and 2(a) follow immediately from Theorem 4.3.
Now consider part 1(b). Even for k = 0 (and in effect so for all k, as those have within them
k = 0 as subcases we can map to) we claim that there is an election system E with a polynomial-time
winner problem such that online-E -CCDV[k] is easily shown to be coNP-hard, namely by a ≤pm-
reduction from the coNP-complete tautology problem. The mapping and E are inspired by the proof
of Theorem 4.2: We use the lexicographically least candidate name to be a proposed tautology and
we use the voters as tests of various assignments to it (if the assignment satisfies, everyone wins).
So the problem can force the chair’s top choice (candidate a, see the proof of Theorem 4.2) to win
exactly if the formula is a tautology. As in the statement and proof of Theorem 4.2, this reduction
maps to outputs having only two candidates.
The proof sketch for part 2(b) (online-E -CCAV[k]) is similar to that of part 1(b). The first
(and current) voter in our reduction is unregistered (but with k = 0 she obviously cannot be added),
and the remaining voters are testing assignments to a proposed tautology and we have only two
candidates, just as in the above proof sketch for online-E -CCDV[k]. ❑
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4.2 Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 4.5 There exist election systems E and E ′, whose winner problems can be solved in
polynomial time, such that online-E -CCPV and online-E ′-DCPV are PSPACE-complete, even when
limited to two candidates.
PROOF. This proof is similar in flavor to the proof of Theorem 4.2, but since we now handle control
by partition of voters, there are some decisive differences.
The election system E is now defined as follows.
Case 1: There is a candidate named RoundOne, and no voter is named Marker. In this case, every-
one loses.
Case 2: There is a candidate named RoundOne and a voter named Marker. In this case, interpret—
in our fixed, natural encoding—the lexicographically least candidate not named RoundOne
as a boolean formula, Φ, whose variable names must be the strings x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ for some ℓ,
and x2ℓ must actually appear in Φ (the others do not have to, but no variable other than
x1,x2, . . . ,x2ℓ can appear in Φ). If this candidate is not of the required syntactic form, exactly
RoundOne wins. If the candidate set does not consist of exactly RoundOne and the above
candidate, then exactly RoundOne wins. If the voter list consists of exactly 2ℓ+1 voters such
that one voter is named Marker, one voter is named vyes1 or vno1 , one voter is named v2, one
voter is named vyes3 or vno3 , . . ., one voter is named v
yes
2ℓ−1 or v
no
2ℓ−1, and one voter is named v2ℓ,
where all subscripts are given in binary, then assign the 2ℓ variables of Φ as follows. (If the
voter list is not exactly that then exactly RoundOne wins.) For each odd i, 1≤ i≤ 2ℓ−1, set xi
to true if there is a voter named vyesi and to false if there is a voter named vnoi . For each even i,
2 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ, set xi to true if the voter named vi has the property that in her preference order
RoundOne is the top choice, and otherwise set xi to false. If this assignment makes Φ true,
then the candidate not named RoundOne is the only winner, otherwise (exactly) RoundOne
wins.
Case 3: There is no candidate named RoundOne. In this case, everyone wins.
This ends the specification of E . Clearly, E has a polynomial-time winner problem, since it is just
evaluating a fully specified and assigned boolean formula, and doing various syntactic checks.
Our online control by partition of voters problems are all in PSPACE by Theorem 4.1. To prove
PSPACE-hardness, we again ≤pm-reduce from the PSPACE-complete problem QBF′ defined in the
proof of Theorem 4.2. Let F(x1, . . . ,x2ℓ) be a given QBF′ instance, where x2ℓ actually occurs in F .
(If our input is syntactically incorrect, then map it to a fixed nonmember of our target problem.)
Our candidate set will be C = {RoundOne,a}, where a will in her name encode F (without loss
of generality, that will not form the string “RoundOne”), a will be our distinguished candidate, our
current voter will be u = v˜0, the chair’s preference order will be a >σ RoundOne, and there will be
3ℓ+1 voters who vote in order v˜0, v˜1, . . . , v˜3ℓ, where v˜0 is named Marker, and the remaining voters
are named as follows:
voter v˜1 v˜2 v˜3 v˜4 v˜5 v˜6 · · · v˜3ℓ−2 v˜3ℓ−1 v˜3ℓ
name v
yes
1 v
no
1 v2 v
yes
3 v
no
3 v4 · · · v
yes
2ℓ−1 v
no
2ℓ−1 v2ℓ
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This ends our statement of the reduction. Why does it work?
If F ∈ QBF′, then
(∃b1)(∀b2) · · · (∃b2ℓ−1)(∀b2ℓ) (1)
[F(x1 := b1,x2 := b2, . . . ,x2ℓ := b2ℓ) evaluates to true],
where the bi ∈ {0,1} are truth assignments. So the partition that puts Marker and all voters vi, i
even, on one side, say into Vleft, and for each vyesi /vnoi pair, i odd, follows (1) by putting vyesi into
Vleft and vnoi into Vright if bi = 1, and vnoi into Vleft and v
yes
i into Vright if bi = 0 (and crucially note that
the preference orders of the vi, i even, we will have seen in the future can (in the future) effect the
future partition choices), will by Case 2 have one first-round election (namely, (C,Vleft)) in which a
is the only winner. And in the other first-round election, (C,Vright), by Case 1 everyone, including
RoundOne, loses. Thus, only a proceeds to the second-round runoff election, where by Case 3
everyone wins, i.e., our distinguished candidate a wins.
In the other direction, suppose F is syntactically correct, and it is possible by some partition of
voters to force “a or better” (so a) to be a winner. Since RoundOne is in both first-round elections
(so Case 3 cannot occur), the only way candidate a can be guaranteed to even survive at least one
first-round election is if we can guarantee that Case 2 is satisfied. But that means that F ∈ QBF′.
Since our reduction can be computed in polynomial time, this shows that online-E -CCPV is
PSPACE-hard.
To show that online-E ′-DCPV is PSPACE-hard, we modify the election system E defined above
as follows, yielding our modified system E ′: Most crucially, Case 2 of the election system descrip-
tion changes to now making everyone lose if Φ evaluates to true under the specified assignment,
and if Φ evaluates to false (or there is any syntactic problem regarding who is in the voter list)
then everyone wins. Case 3 changes to now having everyone lose, and Case 1 stays the same. The
≤pm-reduction from QBF′ remains the same, except that the chair’s preference order will now be
reversed to RoundOne >σ a, and with these changes the reduction can be shown to work correctly
by arguments analogous to those in the constructive case. ❑
The above proof establishes that there are election systems, with polynomial-time winner prob-
lems, for which constructive and destructive online control by partition of voters are PSPACE-
complete even when limited to two candidates. Can we make do with one candidate and still
have PSPACE-hardness? The following result shows that if we could, then PSPACE would equal
NP∩ coNP.6
Theorem 4.6 1. For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem, the prob-
lems online-E -CCPV and online-E -DCPV when limited to one candidate are in NP.
2. There exist election systems E and E ′ with polynomial-time winner problems such that the
problems online-E -CCPV and online-E ′-DCPV, even when restricted to one candidate, are
NP-complete.
6Are elections with just one candidate even ever interesting in the real world? We feel they sometimes are. For
example, a popular referendum—or for that matter a vote in a legislature on a bill—is essentially an up-or-down vote on
one “candidate.” So is a vote on whether to recall an elected official, or to impeach a judge, or to ratify a person who has
been nominated for a sports hall of fame.
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PROOF. We give the proof for the destructive case. For the first part, with one candidate, c, every
voter has the same preference as her full vote: c. So there is no sequentially revealed information,
as in our model we know the voter names (and their order but here that does not matter) as part of
our input. So we just in NP can guess every partition of the voters from u, the current voter, onward,
and see if one of those meets the chair’s destructive goal, “c does not win.”
For the second part, membership in NP follows from the first part. As to NP-hardness, let us
≤pm-reduce from SAT. The election system, E ′, is defined as follows:
Case 1: If there are two or more candidates, everyone wins.
Case 2: If there is one candidate and that candidate’s name gives a syntactically correct boolean
formula ϕ that has, say, k variables, and there are exactly k voters, and if we set the ith
variable of ϕ to true exactly if 1 is the lowest order bit of the voter whose name ranks ith in
lexicographic order among the voters’ names, then ϕ is satisfied either by that assignment or
by the bitwise complemented twin of that assignment, then everyone loses.
Case 3: In all other cases (including syntactical problems), everyone wins.
The reduction SAT ≤pm online-E ′-DCPV is defined as follows. Given a boolean formula
F(x1, . . . ,xk), where without loss of generality all variables actually appear in F , we construct an
online-E ′-DCPV instance with candidate set C = {c}, where c encodes F , the voters are named (in
binary) 1,2, . . . ,2k and they vote in this order, u = 1 is the current voter, the distinguished candidate
is c, and the chair’s preference order σ is c. Clearly, c can be made not a winner if and only if F is
satisfiable. Why?
First, if F is satisfiable then we can determine a satisfying assignment by the partition choices
we make among each voter pair (2i−1,2i), 1≤ i≤ k, by choosing exactly one per pair for the right-
hand side of the partition, such that the left-hand side of the partition has the bit-wise complement
of that same satisfying assignment. So, by the definition of E ′, c will not be a winner in either
first-round subelection, and so will not even be in the final runoff election, which will have zero
candidates, and so c will not be a winner.
Second, if c loses, by the election rule that proves that (Case 2 in the definition of E ′), F is
satisfiable.
The constructive case can be shown analogously. ❑
Corollary 4.7 The following three statements are equivalent:
1. PSPACE = NP∩ coNP.
2. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such that
online-E -DCPV is PSPACE-hard when restricted to one candidate.
3. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such that
online-E -CCPV is PSPACE-hard when restricted to one candidate.
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PROOF. To show equivalence of the first two statements, suppose PSPACE = NP∩ coNP. So
PSPACE = NP. The second statement now follows from the second part of Theorem 4.6. Con-
versely, by the second part’s hypothesis and the first part of Theorem 4.6, we have PSPACE⊆ NP,
which (since PSPACE = coPSPACE) is equivalent to PSPACE = NP∩ coNP. The equivalence of
the first and the third statements is proven analogously. ❑
The analogues of the destructive cases of both parts of Theorem 4.6 also hold when “online”
is removed, i.e., for the problem E -DCPV. In contrast, the constructive non-online analogue of
Theorem 4.6’s first part can be strengthened to a P upper bound. (Why can we get a P result here
but not in Theorem 4.6? The proof of the following result does not apply if some voters are already
committed to sides of the partition—it is assuming (and truly using the fact) that we have full control
of where all voters go. But in the online setting, the current voter u can be a voter who does not
come first and so some voters may already be assigned to sides of the partition. And why do we
get P for constructive but not destructive? The effect the following proof uses is specific to the
constructive case.)
Theorem 4.8 For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem, E -CCPV, when
restricted to one candidate, is in P.
PROOF. For the one candidate to win, she certainly must win the runoff, in which all voters vote.
Also, if she does win when all voters vote, then she can easily be made to survive the first round,
using the partition structure (V, /0). It follows from these two observations that constructive (non-
online) control by partition of voters is possible if and only if the one candidate wins in the election
with voter list V . ❑
5 Online Control for Plurality
We have seen in the previous section that online control can be very hard, namely PSPACE-
complete, even for voting systems whose winners can be determined in polynomial time. In this
section, we study online control for plurality voting. In this very simple yet popular voting system,
every voter gives one point to her most preferred candidate, and all candidates with the most points
win. It is known that non-online control by adding and by deleting voters can be done in polynomial
time, both in the constructive case (since the two relevant unique-winner-model results of [BTT92]
as noted in [FHH14] also hold in the nonunique-winner model) and in the destructive case (since we
have checked and here state as true that those unique-winner-model results of [HHR07] are easily
seen to also hold in the nonunique-winner model). We now show that the corresponding types of
online control are also easy.
Theorem 5.1 The problems online-plurality-CCDV, online-plurality-CCAV,
online-plurality-DCDV, and online-plurality-DCAV are in P.
PROOF. For online-plurality-CCDV, let (C,u,V,σ ,d) be a given basic OVCS, augmented by the
additional information of online control by deleting voters: a deletion upper bound k, for each voter
v before u a flag saying if v was deleted and the vote cast by v (if not deleted), where at most k
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voters can be marked as deleted, and a vote to cast for u (if u is not to be deleted). If d is the chair’s
bottom choice in σ , we are done, since the input then is trivially in online-plurality-CCDV (unless it
is syntactically illegal). If exactly k voters have been marked as already deleted, we can do no more
deletions, so u and all later voters go in, and we assume (as this is the most challenging case) that
all later voters vote for one particular candidate in Λd = {c ∈C |c <σ d} that among the candidates
in Λd has the most first place votes after u is put in, and so we can easily answer the online control
question. If less than k voters have been selected already for deletion, then delete u if and only if u’s
top choice is a highest scoring (with respect to the voters before u) candidate in {c ∈ C | c <σ d}.
Then assume that all later voters vote for one particular candidate in Λd = {c ∈ C | c <σ d} that
among the candidates in Λd has the most first place votes after u is put in. And assume we delete
as many of those as the deletion amount left (after u) allows. It is easy to see whether this results
in “d or better” being a winner (in which case our algorithm answers “yes”) or not (in which case
our algorithm answers “no”). (One might comment that it would suffice, especially to just handle
the decision version, to follow the very simple “operational” approach mentioned on page 4 of
Section 2. However, we have given a more dynamic description of the process both as we want to
make clear how the chair can decide what action to take at each point and as the description above
is also helping establish the correctness of the actions taken.)
For online-plurality-CCAV, let (C,u,V,σ ,d) be a given basic OVCS, augmented by the addi-
tional information of online control by adding voters: an addition upper bound k, for each voter the
information of whether she is registered or not, and for each unregistered voter before u the informa-
tion of whether she has been added or not, the vote of each registered or added voter before u, and
u’s potential vote. Again, the question is trivial if d is the chair’s bottom choice in σ . Otherwise, we
can see what u’s vote is and if k has yet been reached. If k has not been reached yet, we add u if and
only if u’s top choice belongs to {c ∈C | c ≥σ d}.7 And in the worst case all future voters vote for
the same member of {c ∈C | c <σ d}, which will be one that after u votes has the most first-place
votes among those.
The two destructive cases can be handled analogously. The main differences are, in both cases,
that the question now is trivial to decide if d is the chair’s top choice in σ ; in the deleting-voters
case, that u is to be deleted (provided the deletion limit k has not been reached yet) if and only if u’s
top choice is a highest scoring (with respect to the voters before u) candidate in {c∈C |c≤σ d}; and
in the adding-voters case, that u is to be added (provided the addition limit k has not been reached
yet) if and only if u’s top choice belongs to {c ∈C | c >σ d}. And, in both cases, we again assume
that all future votes will belong to some particular member of {c ∈C | c ≤σ d} that after u votes has
the most first-place votes among those candidates. ❑
Non-online control by partition of voters, in the model we feel is most natural and have adopted
in this paper (called “ties promote”), is NP-complete in both the constructive and destructive cases
([HHR07] showed this in the unique-winner model, and we have checked and here state that NP-
completeness also holds for the nonunique-winner model analogues). In contrast, the corresponding
types of online control are both coNP-hard. This implies that these problems cannot be in NP, unless
7Sure enough, u’s top choice could be one of those candidates that end up having only few votes, so adding u could
be a wasted addition that will block some future good addition in some vote sequences, but in the worst case all future
voters put first a candidate disliked by the chair; so our action is fine within the quantifier structure of the problem.
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NP = coNP, which is considered to be highly unlikely. It remains open whether or not they are in
coNP; we conjecture that they are not.
Theorem 5.2 online-plurality-CCPV and online-plurality-DCPV are coNP-hard.
PROOF. We prove this by a reduction from the complement of the following NP-complete problem,
Hitting Set: Given a set B = {b1, . . . ,bm}, a nonempty collection S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} of subsets of B,
and a positive integer k ≤ m, does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., does there exist a set
B′ ⊆ B such that ‖B′‖ ≤ k and for all Si ∈ S , Si ∩B′ 6= /0.
We turn an instance (B,S ,k) of Hitting Set into the following instance of online partition of
voters. The set of candidates is {c,w,b1, . . . ,bm} ∪A, where A = {ai | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4mnk + 1}. The
current voter is u. The votes before u that are on the left side of the partition are exactly the same
as the votes before u that are on the right side of the partition. Both sides of the partition consists of
the following votes.
• 4nk votes c > w > · · · , where · · · denotes that the remaining candidates follow in some arbi-
trary order.
• 4nk votes w > c > · · · .
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 2k votes Si > c > · · · , where Si denotes the candidates in Si in some
arbitrary order.
• For every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, as many votes b j > B−{b j} > c > w > · · · as needed to make the
score of b j equal to 4nk−1 in this subelection.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4mnk, one vote ai > c > · · · and one vote ai > w > · · · .
Voter u votes a4mnk+1 > w > · · · . And there are k voters after u. The chair’s top choice is c and
the chair’s bottom choice is w, and the distinguished candidate is c in the constructive case (i.e., for
online-plurality-CCPV) and w in the destructive case (i.e., for online-plurality-DCPV).
A simple but crucial observation is that no candidate a ∈ A will ever make it to the final round,
since her score in the first round in either subelection will be at most 2+ k, which is less than c’s
score in that subelection. If both c and w participate in the final round, c gains 8mnk points, w gains
8mnk + 1 points, and no other candidate gains points from the voters specified above whose top
choice was in A.
We will show that S does not have a hitting set of size at most k if and only if c can always
be made a winner in the constructed election, and we will show that S does not have a hitting set
of size k if and only if w can always be made to not be a winner in the constructed election. This
proves the theorem.
First suppose that S has a hitting set of size at most k. Let B′ be a hitting set of size k. B′ exists,
since k ≤m. Let the k voters after u vote such that the top choice of the ith voter is the ith candidate
in B′. Then, no matter how we partition the voters, the set of candidates that participate in the
final round is {c,w}∪B′. The scores in the final round are as follows: (a) score(c) = 8nk+ 8mnk,
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(b) score(w) = 8nk+ 8mnk+ 1, and (c) ∑b∈B′ score(b) = 8mnk− 2m+ k. It follows that c is not a
winner and that w is a winner.
For the converse, suppose that S does not have a hitting set of size at most k. Partition by
putting u and all voters after u in the same first-round election. Then the set of candidates in the
final round is {c,w}∪B′, where B′ ⊆ B and ‖B′‖ ≤ k. Since B′ is not a hitting set, in the final round
c gains at least 4k points from voters voting Si > c > · · · such that Si ∩B′ = /0. Thus in the final
election the following hold: (a) score(c) ≥ 8nk+ 8mnk+ 4k, (b) score(w) ≤ 8nk+ 8mnk+ 1+ k,
and (c) ∑b∈B′ score(b)≤ 8mnk−2m+k. It follows that c is the unique winner of this election. ❑
6 Conclusions and Open Questions
Inspired by the maxi-min approach of online algorithms, we studied online voter control in sequen-
tial voting. We showed that for suitably constructed election systems with polynomial-time winner
problems, the resulting voter-control problems can be extremely hard, namely PSPACE-complete,
even for just two candidates. We additionally obtain coNP-completeness for the deleting/adding-
voter cases, even for just two candidates, when there is a bounded deletion/addition limit. For
plurality, things are easier still: Online control by deleting or adding voters is in polynomial time
for plurality, just as in the non-online case.
Attractive future directions include the study of additional natural election systems. Can one
obtain PSPACE-completeness results for highly natural, existing systems, for example? Another in-
teresting direction would be to investigate online control through a typical-case analysis of heuristic
approaches (such as, for example, [MPS08, HH09] do rigorously in a winner-problem setting, see
also [RS13]).
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